In this chapter, we examine the nature of conversations in citizen-police encounters in which police seek to conduct a search based on the citizen's consent. We argue that when police officers ask a person if they can search, citizens often feel enormous pressure to say yes. But judges routinely ignore these pressures, choosing instead to spotlight the politeness and restraint of the officers' language and demeanor. Courts often analyze the language of police encounters as if the conversation has an obvious, context-free meaning. The pragmatic features of language influence behavior, but courts routinely ignore or deny this fact. Instead, current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence assumes that the authority of armed police officers simply vanishes when they pose their desire to search as a question. We discuss empirical evidence suggesting that people are afraid to decline police officer requests to search, and conclude by discussing the social and psychological cost of the widespread use of consent searches.
Introduction
In this chapter, we focus on public encounters between citizens and police officers in the United States. More specifically, we examine encounters in which police question and search citizens without probable cause or even reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
These encounters are legally permitted because courts deem them "consensual." Legal consent depends on whether a reasonable person, when confronted by the police, would feel free to end the conversation, which itself turns in part on the nature of the conversation and its context. It is these conversations, embedded in their social and physical contexts, which we explore in this chapter.
We argue that when police officers seek permission to conduct a search, citizens often feel enormous pressure to say yes. But in most criminal cases, judges do not acknowledge these pressures, generally choosing instead to spotlight the politeness and restraint of the officers' language and demeanor. By ignoring the pragmatic features of the police-citizen encounter, judges are engaging in a systematic denial of the reality of the social meaning underlying these encounters, and are thereby constructing a collective legal myth designed to support current police practices in the "war on drugs." Because consent searches are very common, and because the vast majority of people subjected to consent searches are innocent, 2 the practice of conducting frequent consent searches comes with social and political costs. It is possible that these costs are worthwhile, at least in some cases, depending on the threat at hand. But the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to engage in any serious analysis of this question. We begin with the practical importance of consent searches as a crime investigation tool.
The Role of Consent Searches in Criminal Investigation
Law enforcement practices in the United States today frequently include on-the-fly searches to detect evidence of crime. These searches are not a result of an ongoing investigation, but rather the result of police acting on their instincts and training regarding a person's appearance or behavior or even presence in a particular place. For example, in locations where intercity (e.g., Greyhound) buses make stopovers, local police sometimes make a practice of boarding every bus as it arrives and requesting consent from passengers to search their bags and/or their persons. In airports, law enforcement officers use "drug courier profiles," consisting of a list of behaviors and characteristics, to decide which passengers to approach, question, and perhaps request consent to search for drugs.
Consent searches often follow on the heels of a routine traffic stop. Police pull over drivers for burned out tail-lights, unsignaled lane changes, and speeding. Police incentives to attend to such administrative violations often rest not on the risk posed by the violations themselves, but rather on the opportunity such stops provide for investigating "suspicious" citizens. Which citizens appear suspicious is, of course, in the eye of the beholder. Unfortunately, recently uncovered evidence demonstrates that the race and ethnicity of the driver sometimes influence police judgments about which cars to stop (Ayres 2008; Garcia & Long 2008 ).
The incentives to engage in this type of "drug interdiction" are now quite powerful, with the advent of federal programs that pay large sums of money to local police departments to fund the war on drugs (Bascuas 2007 ). As part of this federal program, some small towns located near an interstate highway have generated millions of dollars in revenue from seized cars and cash after local police succeeded in stopping drivers transporting illegal drugs (Bascuas 2007) . As a result, violations of minor traffic violations are routinely parlayed into consent searches. Thus, the real purpose of many traffic stops is drug interdiction, and minor traffic violations will suffice to justify such stops, 3 even though minor violations are committed by virtually every driver on virtually every trip.
In the absence of probable cause that a crime is being committed, officers rely on the driver's consent to find out what is in the car. In some localities, consent searches have become routine, and are accomplished not only through traffic stops, but also by boarding intercity buses and searching bags. As a tool for ferreting out possession offenses, consent searches are extremely effective. First, consent searches permit police to search when they otherwise would be prohibited from doing so. By some estimates, over 90% of all searches are consent searches (Simmons 2005) . Second, once police decide to request consent to search, they are remarkably successful in obtaining consent --one study found that over 95% of people asked to consent to a search did so. 4 Third, consent searches are low cost --no investigation, wiretaps, warrants are needed. And consent searches are effective in much the same way junk mail or spam email is effective.
If police stop and search enough people, it is just a matter of time until they find evidence of crime. In the next section, we discuss the circumstances under which it is legally permissible for the police to conduct a consent search. "to a reasonable person that he or she was free to refuse," 5 courts consider this to be strong evidence the search was consensual. Courts point to factors such as the police speaking in a polite manner, and asking for permission to search, as indications that the person voluntarily consented. We will return to these factors later.
The second issue, regarding unlawful seizure, is analyzed in a similar manner. The judge's task is to decide whether a reasonable person in that situation would believe that she is free to leave, or to terminate the encounter. Note that both of these tests require courts to interpret the social meaning of behavior -to ascertain what is implicit in a social interaction. For example, a police officer who orders a car to pull over acts with an implicit claim of right, and so a driver or even a passenger in the car would not feel free to leave once the car has been pulled over. 6 We understand this implicitly only because we have internalized certain norms of social behavior; a visitor from another culture might not understand this. Similarly, when a police officer says, "May I please see your license and registration?" we understand this utterance to be not a request, but a command. This understanding is gleaned from our social and cultural understanding of what a police officer means and intends when he utters those words in that context. In the next section, we examine more closely the ways in which contextual implicatures are understood in ordinary conversation between people, and specifically in encounters between police and citizens.
Language
Language is usually the first point of contact between police and citizen. These encounters are dense with meaning, and fraught with the potential for deception. In the hands of a seasoned communicator, clever use of language can gain anyone an advantage over peers. And when that person has a badge, uniform, gun, and the power to change the course of your days, language becomes his or her soft restraint. To appreciate the controlling power of language, we will cover general pragmatics first; then we will turn to its application to police encounters.
Pragmatics Basics
Language is far more than a tool for communicating descriptive facts. Language pleases and cajoles, it scolds and questions. And when it is embedded in a cultural setting, it can intimidate, control, or liberate. But this won't be obvious if we only look at the superficial structure of language. Grice also postulated four "maxims" specifying how to be cooperative in communication. These maxims (quantity, quality, relevance, and manner) all document the way that subtle mechanisms of language -often together with the broader contextcan imply meanings that go beyond the sober, descriptive use of language (Grice 1975 ).
Using a vintage example: Imagine a friend telling you "A man came to my office" only for you later to find that the man was her fiancé, whom you know. You assume that your friend is being cooperative and adhering to the maxim of quantity, which specifies that a speaker should provide enough information for purposes of a conversational exchange. If your friend had been cooperative, she would have specified that her fiancé came by the office. Therefore, the use of the indefinite article with a noun, "a man" creates an implicature that the person who came to the office is not known to you (or possibly that he is but would not be of interest to you.)
Notice what the friend has done here. She has controlled the meaning of the expression by saying something that is strictly true, but she has also manipulated you by correctly predicting your reaction to her violation of selected rules of cooperative communication. In these cases, there is little honor in merely telling the truth, because it is not the whole truth, anything less than the whole truth will mislead, and the speaker designed the statement with the intent to mislead. The violation of these conversational maxims would seem a powerful tool for manipulation.
Pragmatics of Police Encounters
These pragmatic features of language play an important role in citizen-police encounters, including vehicle stops, bus sweeps, airport stops, and street stops. In these encounters, the police officer's main purpose is to get information about what the person is doing, and get permission to do something else, like search their person, house, car, bags, etc.
With the idea of pragmatic implicature now in hand, we can examine the way in which police language can be used to deprive citizens of their sense of control. If the police officer says or does something to diminish the citizen's sense of control, the citizen will not feel that consent could be refused. First, consider the contrast between declarative statements and other kinds of utterances. Much communication is achieved through simple declarative sentences, like "It is raining" or "Electrons have a spin of plus or minus one half." The meaning of declarative statements, like "The cat is on the mat" is given by its truth-conditions. But questions don't have truth conditions. As we We could explore the different implications in each case, but for the moment it is enough to observe the difference in your reactions, and that we are quite used to sentences having different meanings when asserted by people in different stations in life.
The meaning of social exchanges also depends on whether the speakers were invited or unsolicited by chief parties to the exchange. When a citizen summons the police, police presence is a welcome relief. But when officers approach uninvited, it is seldom a happy event for the citizen. Without a clear idea of where this encounter is going and how it will turn out, a citizen would feel irresponsible to treat this exchange like any other. People know that they should be courteous to police, that police carry guns and handcuffs, that they make mistakes that can cause you harm, and that additional police are just a radio call away. They know that the police can handcuff you and take you to the station for processing, and that it can take hours or days to sort out a misunderstanding. So, if a police officer asks to check my backpack or luggage -even if they inform me that I have the right to refuse -I would naturally worry that a refusal would be viewed as grounds for suspicion.
Judicial Misunderstandings of Pragmatic Implicature in Police Encounters
Courts routinely conclude that searches that ensue during police-citizen encounters are voluntary (Nadler 2003 Judges often note that, in requesting consent, the officers made a request rather than a demand. They also note that the officers used a polite tone of voice. Judges routinely conclude that these aspects of language give rise to the inference that the citizen was free to decline to talk to the officers or to decline the request to search. As the Supreme Court put it, a police-civilian encounter is consensual so long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their request is required. 9 Indeed, the Supreme Court has lionized the kind of exchange that takes place between police and citizens in consent searches:
In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers act in full accord with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for the police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange takes place, it dispels inferences of coercion.
10
But is the Court correct that consent searches are typically characterized by the notion of a voluntary agreement between the citizen and the officer (akin, perhaps, to two corporate executives negotiating a licensing agreement)? Do citizens really "advise police of [their] wishes" when they agree to searches that are devoid of probable cause? In short, is it plausible to conclude, as the Court does, that the language of the exchange itself dispels inferences of coercion? Contrary to the Court's conclusion, our discussion in the previous section suggests that this kind of police-citizen exchange heightens, rather than dispels, inferences about coercion. In bus sweep cases, too, some courts have acknowledged that passengers approached by officers requesting permission to search might not feel free to leave or to terminate the encounter. In one case, the Florida Supreme Court found that sheriff's officers who boarded the bus wearing raid jackets, blocking the aisles, and questioning passengers about their destinations had unlawfully seized the passengers, rendering invalid the passengers' subsequent consent to search. 12 And in other Florida bus sweep cases, considered by federal appellate courts, judges found that reasonable passengers would not have felt free to refuse the consent to search, because they had no indication that consent could be refused. 13 Remarkably, in each of the cases just described where the judge has recognized the coerciveness of the police request to search, the U.S. Supreme Court has reversed the lower court's decision and held that there was no unlawful seizure and that consent was freely given. The Supreme Court has made it very clear that considerations about pragmatic implicature are to be ignored in consent search cases, no matter how compelling those considerations might be. Instead, it has signaled to lower courts that an utterance phrased in the form of a question, and spoken in a polite tone, is to be considered a request that can be freely refused, regardless of whether the context of the conversation strongly suggests otherwise.
14 Consider the following example. In the last bus sweep case mentioned above, U.S.
v. Drayton, three police officers boarded a Greyhound bus during a scheduled stopover in Tallahassee Ever since Drayton, lower courts have had no choice but to follow the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court. In doing so, those courts routinely and mechanically point to the police officer's polite tone of voice as a key basis for finding that the defendant voluntarily consented to being searched. 16 Drayton portrayed the questioning police officer as courteous and courtly: "He spoke to passengers one by one and in a polite, quiet voice. Nothing he said would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was barred from leaving the bus or otherwise terminating the encounter…. There was … no threat, and no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice." 17 Indeed, lower courts now seem hesitant to ever find that the defendant's grant of consent to search was coerced, unearthing voluntariness even when the officer issues a direct command. In one recent case, the police pulled over a car and arrested the driver for driving without a license. The officer then asked the passenger if he had any drugs, and asked, "Well, do you mind if I check?" The passenger did not answer and did not gesture. The officer ordered the passenger out of the car. The passenger complied, placing his hands in the air. The police officer then searched the passenger and found drugs. Unbelievably, the court held that the passenger had consented voluntarily to the search by raising his hands in the air. 18 Apparently, when the officer uttered the magic New Jersey courts, for example, have interpreted their state constitution to require a higher level of scrutiny for consent searches. 19 Under this standard, the prosecution must prove that the person consenting knew that she had a choice in the matter. Further, a police officer making a traffic stop is prohibited from requesting consent to search unless he or she has a "reasonable and articulable suspicion" to believe that a crime is occurring. 20 The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that "many persons, perhaps most, would view the request of a police officer to make a search as having the force of law." 21 Several other states follow a similar rule for traffic stops. 22 The Supreme Court of Hawaii has gone further and applies a similar "reasonable suspicion" rule for requesting consent during any police encounter, not just traffic stops. 23 The highest courts of these states have each acknowledged that when a police officer says, "Do you mind if I search?" the pragmatic implicature is often that cooperation is not just requested but required.
Empirical Evidence Regarding the Language of Consent in Police Encounters
Given the nature of police authority and the context of the citizen-police encounter, it is highly likely that police requests to search are often interpreted as commands to permit the search to take place. But the extent to which citizens feel compelled to accede to a police request is an empirical question (Nadler 2003) . Not much empirical evidence is available to help answer that question. But there is some, which we will review next.
First, consider an illustration used by courts as the paradigmatic example of when no seizure takes place: a police office approaches a citizen on a sidewalk and asks a question. Recall that if a police officer unlawfully seizes someone, then any subsequent search is deemed invalid. The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized this kind of sidewalk encounter as a "perfect example of police conduct that supports no colorable claim of seizure." 24 That is to say, the Court assumes the citizen in that situation clearly feels free to terminate the encounter or to leave.
But do people in fact feel free to terminate that type of sidewalk encounter?
Kessler (2009) conducted a survey to find out, and it turns out the answer is mostly, no.
Respondents read a scenario in which they are walking on the sidewalk when a police officer approaches and says, "I have a few questions to ask you." Respondents indicated how free they would feel to walk away or decline to talk with the officer. About half of the respondents indicated that they would not feel free to leave in this situation. 25 Remarkably, only about 20% of respondents indicated that they felt free to leave or decline. 26 Thus, most people do not in fact feel free to terminate the very type of police encounter that the Supreme Court considers the clearest example of a completely consensual conversation. It is clear that the Court's conception of the level of coercion present in ordinary citizen-police encounters is greatly at odds with the conception of ordinary people when they think hypothetically about interacting with police.
Moving from the hypothetical to the actual, consider next Lichtenberg's (1999) survey of Ohio motorists who had been stopped recently by police for traffic violations and asked for their consent to search. Of the 54 drivers interviewed, 49 reported that they had agreed to the request to search. Of these 49, all but two said they consented because they were afraid of what would happen if they said no. Their fears included having their trip unduly delayed, being searched anyway, incurring property damage to their car if they refused, being arrested, being beaten, or being killed. Some of these concerns were apparently well founded: of the five motorists who declined to consent to the search, two reported being searched despite their explicit refusal to consent. Another motorist who refused to consent was not searched but was threatened with future retaliation, which left him so shaken that he avoids driving on the road near his home where he was stopped.
The fact that such a large percentage of this sample reported feeling afraid to decline the officer's request to search suggests a possible solution: require police who request consent to search to advise citizens of their right to refuse (Solan & Tiersma 2005) . 27 Although on its face this requirement might seem promising, it is not a panacea.
There is no reason to believe that giving a warning would dispel the coercion inherent in police encounters. In fact, there is empirical evidence suggesting that such warnings have no effect on people's willingness to refuse consent. Lichtenberg (2001) examined all
Ohio highway stops between 1995 and 1997. For part of the period studied, police were not required to advise motorists of their right to refuse consent, and for part of the period, police were required to do so. 28 Remarkably, the same percentage of motorists consented with the warnings as without the warnings. Apparently, people are unaffected by the warnings because they do not believe them --they feel that they will be searched regardless of whether or not they consent, as illustrated by the interviews just discussed.
Conclusion: Hollow Politeness and Its Consequences for Innocent Citizens
No one knows precisely how many innocent people are subjected to consent searches each year, but there is little doubt that the number is staggering. One officer conducting bus sweeps testified that he had searched 3000 bags in the previous nine months. 29 In some localities, police officers ask every motorist they stop for consent to search. 30 One officer in Ohio made, in one year, 786 requests for consent to search motorists pulled over for routine traffic violations. 31 But consent searches are not costless. People are shaken by them and don't forget them quickly. The vast majority of people subjected to consent searches are innocent.
This is a fact that is easily forgotten because consent searches often come to our attention via published exclusionary rule cases, in which the defendant was factually guilty. How do consent searches affect the lives of innocent people --that is, people who possess no illegal drugs or guns, are not engaged in illegal activity, yet find themselves submitting to a search?
The Supreme Court paints a wholesome picture of a citizen and a police officer engaging in polite conversation, in which the officer and the citizen amicably agree that the officer is free to search her person or possessions, after which the citizen bids the officer good day and goes on her way. But in the real world, people subjected to searches do not live happily ever after. The Lichtenberg (1999) When police question citizens or rummage through their possessions and find nothing, they leave in their wake a flood of shaken people. Those feelings of contingency or personal insecurity frustrate well-being. At best, subjecting citizens to suspicionless searches amounts to a loss of liberty. At worst, it threatens the legitimacy of the police and the legal system more broadly (Nadler 2003; . People who feel that the legal system is worthy of respect are more likely to comply with legal rules regulating their everyday experiences (Tyler 1991; Nadler 2005) .
We have demonstrated in this chapter that the power of language and context to intimidate is well established. By choosing to ignore the intimidating power of language in a commanding context, the courts have adopted an interpretation of police exchanges with citizens that favors expedience over justice, and the interests of an unsustainable war
